‘New’ guidance on the application of the referral mechanism: a warning to watch out!

07 Sep 2022

On 26 March 2021, the European Commission issued new guidance on the interpretation of the upward referral mechanism set out in Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation. (1)

As a result, EU Member States can now submit concentrations (i.e. mergers, joint-ventures, acquisitions…) to the Commission for assessment even though such transactions fall below the national turnover thresholds. The reason for this new guidance is clear: in some sectors a transaction may have a high impact on competition even though the turnovers are fairly low (e.g. a digital disruptive scale up company), therefore, market power is being built up while there is technically no need to file an EU merger notification. A ruling on a landmark case relating to this has been issued by the Commission on 6 September 2022.

As general M&A practitioners we recommend that enterprises who are planning a transaction pay special attention to this matter in connection with their internal or external competition law counsel. Here follows our analysis of this new guidance and its impact on M&A practice in a nutshell.

What is changing?

Until recently, concentrations that met certain national thresholds only needed to be scrutinised/assessed by the national competition authority. This meant that concentrations that did not meet the relevant thresholds did not qualify for control and therefore no notification or approval by the national competition authority or the Commission was required.

With its guidance of 26 March 2021, the Commission has changed the playing field. EU Member States can still submit concentrations which fall below the national turnover thresholds to the Commission for assessment if they consider that the concentration could affect trade between Member States and may significantly impede proper competition within Member State territory.

Surprisingly enough, this new ‘rule’ was not provided by new legislation or even a new regulation but merely by the Commission’s interpretation of the EU Merger Regulation, established in a guidance communication. However, please note that the guidance itself indicates that its aim is only to provide general guidance on the appropriateness of particular categories of cases for referral under Article 22 of the Merger Regulation. The Member States and the Commission retain a considerable margin of discretion in deciding whether to refer cases or accept referrals, respectively. It will be important to monitor the situation in light of this clarification.

Why a new interpretation?

The Commission found that a number of transactions where companies had a low turnover but a strong competitive potential in the internal market had not been assessed by the Commission or the national competition authorities. As a result, it found that there was an enforcement gap between national and EU merger control. 

It seems that the Commission wants to ensure that the referral mechanism of Article 22 of the EU Regulation is used more often. This should stop such enforcement gaps from occurring and should limit the subsequent potential significant effects on competition and the internal market.

In its new interpretation, the Commission mainly targets so-called ‘killer acquisitions’, i.e. acquisitions where an established competitor acquires an innovative company/start-up company with strong competitive potential but little to no turnover in the early stages of its development.

It is apparently more and more common to see competing and innovative companies merge. The Commission notes that this is particularly common in the digital and pharmaceutical sectors. 

Such mergers which may have an impact on competition or eliminate an important competitive force, but which fall below the national turnover thresholds, can now be submitted to the Commission for assessment. 

Which concentrations will now be assessed by the Commission?

In its guidance the Commission lists the criteria that it may take into account when deciding whether to accept a referral.

Notably, the guidance indicates that the following concentrations will be considered appropriate for a referral: 

  1. transactions where the turnover of at least one of the companies concerned does not reflect its current or future competitive potential (clearly targeting start-ups or recent market entrants with a significant competitive potential, or major innovators);
  2. transactions where a company acquires an actual or potential significant competitive force;
  3. transactions where a company acquires a company with access to, or impact on, competitively valuable assets;
  4. transactions where a company acquires another company that provides products or services which are key inputs or components for other industries.

It is important to note that even if the transaction has already been closed, it is still possible for a national competition authority to refer it to the Commission. The Commission states that it would generally not consider a referral made six months after closing, but that in exceptional situations a late referral may still be appropriate due to the magnitude of the potential competition concerns and the potential detrimental effects for consumers.

What are the consequences?

The adverse consequences for companies are very clear, for example, if we look at the first case linked to this new interpretation – the acquisition of Grail by Illumina. Grail is a US company focused on detecting multiple early-stage cancers, Illumina is a US based gene sequencing specialist. In this case, the Commission imposed interim measures to ‘suspend’ the acquisition whilst it scrutinised the transaction and threatened to impose fines for breach of the standstill obligation (Illumina announced the closing of the deal on 18 August 2021). 

The Commission stated that the interim measures aim to prevent the potentially irreparable detrimental impact of the transaction on competition, as well as the possible irreversible integration of the vertically integrating parties, pending the outcome of the Commission's merger investigation.

Illumina, unpleased by the Commission’s investigation as the transaction did not meet any of the EU/national antitrust thresholds, fought the referral to the Commission in front of the General Court. On 13 July 2022, the General Court upheld that the Commission’s antitrust case was legal. It also confirmed the Commission’s authority to examine a transaction that does not have a European dimension, but which is the subject of a referral request made by a Member State under Article 22 of the EU merger Regulation – even if the transaction is not notifiable in that Member State (see Illumina v. Commission case). (2)

The outcome of the referral and the Commission’s decision on the acquisition of Grail by Illumina was issued on 6 September 2022 (3). Indeed, the Commission has decided that the remedies offered by Illumina were not sufficient to address its competition concerns. As a result, it has prohibited the transaction and requires Illumina to dissolve the concentration or to take other appropriate measures. In addition, the Commission is still assessing whether the companies have violated their standstill obligation. In the event it finds so, both companies could face a fine of up to 10% of their global revenue. It is to be noted, however, that Illumina can still appeal the Commission’s decision.

Conclusions

It is clear to us that the Commission’s new interpretation of the upward referral mechanism will have a very concrete impact on any ongoing or future acquisitions, even when national thresholds are not met. 

Parties will have to carefully consider which approach to take for their transactions. If a (potential) significant impact on competition is expected, it may be a good idea to file a notification for the transaction to obtain pre-closing comfort, or to challenge any referral in front of the General Court. 

Extended timelines in all types of transactions are to be expected, and the typical negotiation table discussions on ‘long stop dates’ and ‘gun jumping’ may become even more challenging. 

Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact our M&A colleagues at PwC Legal Pierre Queritet, Sixtine Borres or Stijn Vanbaelen for more information.


(1) COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004R0139&from=EN and Communication from the Commission, 26 March 2021, Commission Guidance on the application of the referral mechanism set out in Article 22 of the Merger Regulation to certain categories of cases, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2021_merger_control/guidance_article_22_referrals.pdf

(2) Judgment of the General Court, 13 July 2022, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=262846&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4879008

(3) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5364

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